

Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 04697 230957Z

44

ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /031 W

----- 088299

R 230912Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7280

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 176

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 4697

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: CSCE: THE CONFERENCE ONE YEAR LATER

SUMMARY: CSCE: BEGAN IN HELSINKI ONE YEAR AGO, AFTER LENGTHY PREPARATORY TALKS, AND WILL ADJOURN FOR FIVE WEEKS ON JULY 26. DESPITE DELAYS RESULTING FROM SOVIET OBSTINACY, AND SOME MAJOR UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS, THE CONFERENCE STILL OFFERS POSSIBILITIES FOR MEANINGFUL RESULTS AND A SUMMIT LEVEL FINALE. WE SHOULD NOW WORK CLOSELY WITH OUR ALLIES TO BRING ABOUT A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. END SUMMARY.

1. STATE OF WORK--CSCE HAS BEEN LARGELY STALEMATED SINCE THE EASTER BREAK BECAUSE THE SOVIETS, DESPITE PRE-EASTER ASSURANCES, HAVE BEEN UNWILLING TO ALLOW ANY MEANINGFUL PROGRESS ON BASKET III (HUMANITARIAN) ISSUES. THEIR FAILURE TO DO THIS IS CLEARLY THE REASON WHY CSCW HAS NOT BEEN CONCLUDED THIS SUMMER, AS VIRTUALLY ALL PARTICIPANTS THOUGHT IT WOULD BE. THE CASUSES OF THIS SOVIET OBSTINACY ARE UNCLEAR, BUT CAN PROBABLY BE ATTRIBUTED TO A COMBINATION OF FACTORS: INTERNAL OPPOSITION TO BREZHEV'S DETENTE POLICY; UNCERTAINTY OVER THE POLICY DIRECTION OF MAJOR NEW WESTERN GOVERNMENTS; AND UNDER-ESTIMATION OF WESTERN

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 GENEVA 04697 230957Z

INTEREST IN BASKET III. THE ASSURANCES MENTIONED ABOVE

WERE MADE WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS TO THE CHIEFS OF SEVERAL MAJOR WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN A SOVIET EFFORT TO GET A "CRYSTAL CLEAR" PRINCIPLE OF INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. THE FAILURE OF THE SOVIETS TO LIVE UP TO THEIR WORD HAS REINFORCED THE SKEPTICISM AND STUBBORNESS OF MANY WESTERN AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. CSCE HAS THUS FAILED TO MEET ITS EXPECTED SCHEDULE AND THE SOVIETS MUST BEAR THE MAJOR PART OF THE BLAME FOR THE DELAY.

2. UNRESOLVED ISSUES--THE OUTLINES OF COMPROMISE AGREEMENTS ON MOST CONFERENCE ISSUES HAVE BEEN DISCERNIBLE FOR SOME TIME, BUT SEVERAL MAJOR QUESTION MARKS REMAIN. PRIMARY AMONG THESE ARE:

- A) FREER MOVEMENT--THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIETS WILL MEET WESTERN DEMANDS FOR FREER MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, IDEAS AND INFORMATION IN BASKETS II (ECONOMIC) AND III (HUMANITARIAN) AREAS;
- (B) MILITARY MOVEMENTS--HOW TO CLOSE THE CSCE "STUDY" OF THE QUESTION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS WITHOUT PASSING THIS MANDATE ON TO CSCE FOLLOW-UP;
- C) MFN--HOW TO PHRASE AN ALLUSION TO MFN WHICH WILL NOT SINGLE OUT THE US IN AN UNACCEPTABLE WAY, AND WILL MAKE BALANCED REFERENCE TO OBSTACLES TO TRADE OF STATE TRADING SYSTEMS AND EUROPEAN QUOTE RESTRICTIONS;
- D) THE MEDITERRANEAN-- HOW TO SATISFY AMBITIONS OF MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES FOR A FAR-REACHING DECLARATION WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING ESSENTIAL US AND NATO INTERESTS;
- E) FOLLOW-UP--HOW TO COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE EC-NINE PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD AND THE EASTER/NEUTRAL DESIRE FOR A COMMITMENT NOW TO PERIODIC GENERAL FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS;
- F) THIRD STAGE--HOW TO AGREE ON LEVEL AND TIMING OF THE THIRD STAGE.

3. US POLICY--RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS MENTIONED ABOVE, AND THE MANY SECONDARY ISSUES IN CSCE, CALLS FOR CLOSE AND ACTIVE WORK WITH OUR ALLIES AS STAGE II NEARS ITS END. THE PROGRAM OF CONSULTATION ON ESSENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 04697 230957Z

REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION WHICH HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN NATO IS A MAJOR STEP TOWARD THE ACTIVE COOPERATION WHICH IS NOW REQUIRED. WE BELIEVE THIS PROCESS SHOULD BE CONTINUED IN BOTH BRUSSELS AND GENEVA, WITH A VIEW NOT ONLY TO ESTABLISHING ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS, BUT ALSO, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, TO OBTAINING THEM. FOR OBVIOUS POLITICAL REASONS THE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF SHOULD BE USED

AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS EFFORT IMPLIES A FUNDATMENTAL REAPPRAISAL OF THE USG ATTITUDE TOWARD CSCE. OUR ATTITUDE TO DATE HAS BEEN AMBIGUOUS, AS WE PRIVATELY DOWNGRADED THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CSCE, BUT JOINED THE SOVIETS IN PUBLICLY CITING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUMMIT-LEVEL CONCLUSION IN VIEW OF THE "HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE" OF THE CONFERENCE. CONTINUED INDICATIONS OF THIS AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE CAN ONLY FUEL SUSPICIONS AND RESENTMENT AMONG OUR ALLIES AND HINDER OUR EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A CONSTRUCTIVE CONCLUSION. WHATEVER OUR VIEW OF IT AT THE OUTSET, THE CSCE HAS NOW TAKEN ON AN IMPORTANCE OF ITS OWN, AT LEAST FOR THE EUROPEANS, AND WE SHOULD TREAT THE ISSUES IN IT AS SERIOUSLY AS OUR ALLIES TREAT THEM. THIS WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LANGUAGE ON CSCE IN THE MOSCOW SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE, AND WOULD HELP TO JUSTIFY THE ACTIVE ROLE WHICH WE HAVE NOW UNDERTAKEN IN NATO ON THIS SUBJECT. IN SHORT, WE SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO AVOID ACTIONS REGARDING CSCW WHICH MIGHT CAUSE FRICTION OR DIVISION WITH OUR ALLIES, WHO ARE GENERALLY UNITED IN THEIR VIEW OF THE CONFERENCE.

4. CONCLUSIONS--DESPITE THE DELAYS, CSCE CONTINUES TO BE AN HISTORIC EVENT WAITING TO BE BORN. WHILE NO ONE EXPECTS THAT ITS RESULTS WILL BRING ABOUT BASIC CHANGES IN THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE, THE BREADTH OF ITS SUBJECT MATTER AND ITS POLITICAL IMPACT SHOULD ENSURE ITS PLACE AS A MAJOR LANDMARK IN THE POST-WAR HISTORY OF EUROPE. FOR MANY EUROPEANS, IT WILL INDEED BE THE SURROGATE PEACE TREATY WHICH WILL BROADLY LEGITIMIZE THE DE FACTO RESULTS OF WORLD WAR II. IT WILL ALSO CONTAIN IMPORTANT SPECIFIC POINTS, INCLUDING THE

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 GENEVA 04697 230957Z

FIRST EUROPE-WIDE MILITARY AGREEMENT IN RECENT HISTORY, AND SOME OF THE FIRST MULTILATERAL STEPS TOWARD NORMALIZATION OF CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. WHAT THE RESULTS OF CSCW WILL MEAN FOR THE FUTURE REMAINS TO BE SEEN, BUT THE RECENT APPRAISAL OF AN EASTERN DELEGATE HERE MAY WELL PROVE TO BE ACCURATE--THAT THE FINAL CSCE DOCUMENTS WILL SERVE TO "DEFINE THE RULES OF THE GAME OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE". ABRAMS

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, MEETING PROCEEDINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 23 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974GENEVA04697
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740198-0829
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740726/aaaaawcv.tel
Line Count: 163
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 08 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <08 APR 2002 by kelleyw0>; APPROVED <24 JUN 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CSCE: THE CONFERENCE ONE YEAR LATER SUMMARY: CSCE: BEGAN IN HELSINKI ONE YEAR AGO, AFTER
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005